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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
ROLAND WEBB,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
Supreme Court
No. 870360

R.O.A. GENERAL, INC., a
Utah corporation, WILLIAM
REAGAN, individually,
and DOUGLAS T. HALL,
individually,
Defendants-Respondents.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT ROLAND WEBB
JURISDICTION
This appeal is taken from an order of the Third
Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County denying Appellant
Roland Webb's ("Webb") motion for partial summary judgment and
granting Respondents R.O.A. General, Inc.'s ("R.O.A.") and
William Reagan's ("Reagan") cross-motions for partial summary
judgment.

The District Court's order has been certified as a

final judgment pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 54(b).

Appellate

jurisdiction is conferred upon the Utah Supreme Court pursuant to
the provisions of R. Utah S. Ct. 3(a), Utah R. Civ. P. 54(b), and
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(i).
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Did the District Court err in holding, as a matter

of law, that the mere notice by Respondent R.O.A. of its exercise
-1-

of an option to repurchase stock owned by Webb terminated Webb's
stock ownership and therefore his right, as a shareholder of
record, to examine the books and records of R.O.A. pursuant to
Utah Code Ann. § 16-10-47(b)?
2.

Was Webb's written demand to examine the books and

records of R.O.A. in order to verify their accuracy, to evaluate
the financial condition of R.O.A. and to determine the value of
his R.O.A. stock, as a matter of law, reasonably related to
Webb's interest as a shareholder and therefore a proper purpose
under Utah Code Ann. § 16-10-47(b)?
3.

Was Webb's request to examine the books and

records of R.O.A. during regular business hours, as a matter of
law, a request to examine said books and records at a reasonable
time?
4.

Is Webb entitled to recover from R.O.A., Reagan,

president of R.O.A., and Douglas Hall ("Hall"), legal counsel to
R.O.A., the statutory penalty for each of their respective
separate refusals to permit Webb to examine the books and records
of R.O.A. in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 16-10-47(c)?
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES
Utah Code Ann. § 16-10-47(b)-(c) (1986):
(b) Any person who is a shareholder of record,
upon written demand stating the purpose* thereof, shall
have the right to examine, in person, or by agent or
attorney, at any reasonable time or times, for any
proper purpose, its books and records of account,
minutes and record of shareholders and to make extracts
therefrom. A proper purpose means a purpose reasonably
related to the person / s interest as a shareholder.
(c) Any officer or agent who, or a corporation
which, shall refuse to allow any such shareholder, or
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his agent or attorney, so to examine and make extracts
from its books and records of account, minutes, and
record of shareholders, for any proper purpose, shall
be liable to such shareholder in a penalty of 10% of
the value of the shares owned by such shareholder, in
addition to any other damages or remedy afforded him by
law; but no such penalty shall exceed $5,000. It shall
be a defense to any action for penalties under this
section that the person suing therefor has within two
years sold or offered for sale any list of shareholders
of such corporation or any other corporation or has
aided or abetted any person in procuring any list of
shareholders for any such purpose, or has improperly
used any information secured through any prior
examination of the books and records of account, or
minutes, or record of shareholders of such corporation
or any other corporation, or was not acting in good
faith or for a proper purpose in making his demand,
(emphasis added).
Utah Code Ann. § 16-10-2(15) (1986):
(15) "Shareholder" means one who is a holder of
record of shares in a corporation.
Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c):
(c) Motion and Proceedings Thereon. The motion
shall be served at least ten days before the time fixed
for the hearing. The adverse party prior to the day of
hearing may serve opposing affidavits. The judgment
sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions
of file, together with the affidavits, if any, show
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact
and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as
a matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in
character, may be rendered on the issue of liability
alone although there is a genuine issue as to the
amount of damages.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
This is an action by Webb to compel R.O.A. and Reagan
to allow Webb to examine the books and records of account of
R.O.A. pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 16-10-47(b) and to recover
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the statutory penalties imposed under § 16-10-47(c) for each
refusal by R.O.A., Reagan and Hall to allow such examination.
Disposition in the District Court
This appeal is taken from a final judgment of the Third
Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, which judgment
granted R.O.A.'s and Reagan's motions for partial summary
judgment, and held that because R.O.A. gave notice of exercise of
its option to repurchase Webb's shares in R.O.A., Webb ceased to
be a shareholder of R.O.A. and therefore has no right to examine
the books and records of R.O.A. pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 1610-47(b).

The rulings of this partial summary judgment are

contained in the District Court's minute order dated July 21,
1987, (R. at 290-291), and formal order dated August 7, 1987, (R.
at 313-315).

The District Court's August 7, 1987 order has been

certified by the District Court as a final judgment pursuant to
Utah R. Civ. P. 54(b), as reflected in the District Court's
minute order dated September 1, 1987, (R. at 352), and formal
order dated September 28, 1987, (R. at 377-378).
Statement of Facts
By written agreement dated July 7, 1981, Webb and
Reagan formed R.O.A., a Utah corporation.
484).

(R. at

62-78, 483-

Reagan obtained 80% of the stock of R.O.A. and Webb and

his wife acquired the remaining 20% stock interest (the "Webb
Stock").

(R. at

34, 203, 274). Reagan is presently the

president and 80% shareholder of R.O.A.

(R. at

34, 203, 274).

The July 7, 1981 Agreement provided, among other things, that
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R.O.A. had an option (the "Option") to purchase the Webb Stock at
a price to be determined by independent appraisals.
78).

(R. at

62-

By letter dated January 27, 1987, R.O.A. gave notice of its

exercise of the Option.

(R. at

43, 78A, 207, 280, 484, 508).

On April 20, 1987, Webb notified R.O.A. and Reagan that he was
exercising his right pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 16-10-47(b) to
examine the books and records of R.O.A. to determine its
financial condition, to verify the accuracy of its books and
records, and to determine the approximate value of his stock
prior to submitting it to an independent valuation.

(R. at

53,

485) .
On or about May 5, 1987, Norman Clark, Vice-President
of Administration and Finance of R.O.A., informed Webb that
Reagan would be out of the country until May 18, 1987, and
insisted that Webb defer his examination until May 18, 1987.
at

(R.

54, 485). On May 18, 1987, Webb renewed in writing his

request to examine the books and records of R.O.A.

(R. at

55-

56, 485, 514). By letter dated May 20, 1987, Webb's counsel
notified Reagan that Webb's accountants would begin their
examination at 10:00 a.m. on Wednesday, May 27, 1987, a regular
business day, at R.O.A.'s corporate offices in Salt Lake City.
(R. at 57, 93, 485).
Webb's agents, certified public accountants with the
accounting firm of Peat Marwick Main & Co., and Webb's counsel,
Victoria E. Brieant, Esq., arrived at the offices of R.O.A. at
10:00 a.m. on Wednesday, May 27, 1987, to begin their inspection
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and examination of the books and records.

(R. at

93, 485-486).

William H. Adams ("Adams")# corporate counsel for R.O.A., and
Reagan refused to permit either Webb's counsel or Webb's
accountants to inspect the books and records of R.O.A. that day.
Although Webb's counsel reminded Adams that Webb had a statutory
right to examine the books and records of R.O.A., Adams, Reagan
and R.O.A. nevertheless refused to permit such an examination.
(R. at

93-94).

R.O.A.'s, Reagan's and Adam's refusal to permit

Webb's inspection was confirmed by letter dated May 26, 1987,
from Adams.

(R. at

58, 94).

On June 3, 1987, Webb repeated his demand to examine
the books and records of R.O.A.

Webb designated 10:00 a.m. on

Friday, June 5, 1987, a regular business day, at R.O.A.'s
corporate offices in Salt Lake City as the time and place for the
examination.

(R. at

59-60, 94, 485). On June 4, 1987, Webb's

counsel telephoned Adams to determine whether R.O.A. would comply
with Utah Code Ann. § 16-10-47(b) and permit Webb to proceed with
the examination.

(R. at

95, 485-486).

Among other things,

Adams told Webb's counsel that Reagan and R.O.A. refused to allow
the examination because it would allegedly disrupt its business
and because there were no employees available to locate the
company's files.

(R. at 95).

At 5:00 p.m. on June 4, 1987, Adams caused to be
delivered to counsel for Webb a letter dated June 4, 1987, in
which Adams stated that R.O.A. would not allow Webb, his agents
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or attorneys to examine the books and records of R.O.A. until
June 15, 1987.

(R. at

61, 95-96).

On June 15, 1987, the examination date specified by Adams,
Webb's counsel and certified public accountants from Peat Marwick
Main & Co. retained by Webb arrived at the corporate offices of
R.O.A. at 9:00 a.m. to begin the examination.

(R. at 96).

At

that time, Hall, R.O.A.'s in-house counsel, and Reagan refused to
permit Webb's counsel and the accountants to examine the books
and records of account of R.O.A.

(R. at 96).

Hall and Reagan

informed Webb's counsel for the first time that it was their
position that Webb was no longer a shareholder of R.O.A. because
R.O.A. had exercised its option to purchase Webb's shares.

(R.

at 96).
It is undisputed that Webb has not, within the two year
period prior to this action, sold or offered for sale any list of
shareholders of R.O.A. or any other corporation.

He has not

aided or abetted any person in procuring any list of shareholders
for any such purpose.

Webb has not improperly used any

information secured through any prior examination of the books
and records of account or minutes, or record of shareholders of
such corporation or any other corporation, so as to provide
R.O.A. and Reagan a defense pursuant to Utah Code Ann., § 16-1047(c).

(R. at 487).
CASE OF FIRST IMPRESSION
Appellant Webb is unaware of any authority in Utah or

elsewhere supporting the District Court's legal conclusion that
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mere receipt by a stockholder of notice of exercise of an option
to purchase his shares extinguishes his status and legal rights
as a shareholder.

Each jurisdiction that has confronted this

issue has rejected the conclusion of the District Court and has
ruled in favor of the position advanced by Webb.
The instant case presents a case of first impression in
Utah on this narrow and important issue.

Given the large number

of active closely held Utah corporations and the common usage of
Stock Redemption Agreementsf Shareholder Buy/Sell Agreements and
other stock option arrangements to order and govern shareholder
relationships and to plan for the orderly disposition of closely
held stock, the question of how and when a shareholder's status
and rights under Utah Code Ann. § 16-10-47 are terminated
deserves a definitive answer from Utah's highest court.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
There are no disputed issues of material fact in this
case.

The District Court simply committed error in stating and

applying the law to the undisputed facts. Appellant Webb seeks
(i) a reversal of the District Court's order granting partial
summary judgment in favor of R.O.A. and Reagan and denying Webb's
motion for partial summary judgment and (ii) this Court's order
directing the District Court to enter judgment in favor of Webb
and against R.O.A., Reagan and Hall under Count II of Webb's
Amended Complaint.
It is well-settled that, with respect to questions of
law, the Utah Supreme Court "is not bound by the conclusions of
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the trial court and may determine the question."
Clark. 658 P.2d 585, 587 n.l (Utah 1982).

Olwell v.

Generally, legal

issues are entitled to the full breadth of appellate review.

In

Provo City Corp. v. Nielson Scott Co., 603 P.2d 803, 805 (Utah
1979), this Court stated, with respect to questions of law, that
"the same deference need not be accorded the lower court's
position as we would accord findings of fact."

See Jeppson v.

Jeppson, 684 P.2d 69, 70 (Utah 1984) (Supreme Court will reverse
trial court where it misapplies principal of law); Brigham v.
Moon Lake Electric Association, 24 Utah 2d 292, 295-96, 470 P.2d
393, 396 (1970) (Supreme Court may reverse for error of law).
The Utah Supreme Court has the authority not only to
vacate the decision of the District Court but also to direct the
District Court to enter a judgment in favor of Webb.

In a case

procedurally similar to the instant case, this Court stated:
[W]hen there are no issues of fact to be determined and the
only dispute involves a question of law, we think this court
has the duty and the power when a matter is before us to
direct the lower court to enter a judgment according to the
law of the case. . . . [W]e think the better procedure is
for the court to grant the appropriate relief when there is
no unresolved issue of any material fact to be determined.
Christensen v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, 21 Utah 2d 194, 200,
443 P.2d 385, 389 (1968).

See Clark v. Shelton. 584 P.2d 875,

878 n.l (Utah 1978) ("[W]here, as in this case, the only issue is
one of law, there is no reason to remand for further
consideration."); Leithead v. American Colloid Co.P 721 P.2d
1059, 1064 (Wyo. 1986) (in reversing summary judgment, the court
may enter summary judgment in favor of appellant).

-9-

Since no

disputed issues of material fact were presented in the summary
judgment proceedings, Webb respectfully requests the Court not
only to reverse the judgment of the District Court on the
threshold issue of Webb's shareholder status, but to rule on the
other determinative questions of law outlined in the section of
this Brief entitled "Issues Presented For Review."

Deciding all

such questions of law in these proceedings will prevent further
costly delays and proceedings before the District Court and
potential additional proceedings before this Court.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
POINT I:

A shareholder of record of a Utah corporation

has a statutory right to examine the corporation's books and
records.

This right of examination is secured to the shareholder

until he ceases to be a shareholder of record.

A shareholder

does not cease to be a shareholder of record until his shares are
paid for and his stock is endorsed and transferred on the books
and records of the corporation.

Consequently, R.O.A.'s mere

notice to Webb of its exercise of an option to purchase his
R.O.A. stock did not terminate Webb's shareholder status or
extinguish his statutory right of examination.
POINT II; Whether a shareholder's stated purpose for
examining a corporation's books and records is a "proper purpose"
within the meaning of Utah Code Ann. § 16-10-47(b) is a question
of law.

Utah Code Ann. § 16-10-47(b) is patterned after Delaware

Code, Title 8, § 220(b)(1974); Delaware case law is therefore
instructive on this issue.

The Delaware Supreme Court has held
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that determining the value of one's stock and ascertaining the
propriety of certain business conducted by the corporation's
officers are, as a matter of law, proper purposes for a
shareholder's examination of the corporation's books and records.
Webb's demand under Utah Code Ann. § 16-10-47(b) to examine
R.O.A.'s books and records to determine the accuracy and
integrity of the corporation's recordkeeping as well as the
propriety of business conducted by the officers of R.O.A. and to
ascertain the financial condition of R.O.A. and therefore the
value of his stock is, as a matter of law, a proper purpose
within the meaning of the statute.

Finally, Webb's request to

examine R.O.A.'s books and records during R.O.A.'s normal
business hours was, as a matter of law, a request to examine such
books and records at a reasonable time.
POINT III;

Utah Code Ann. § 16-10-47(c) imposes

against each corporation, and each of its officers and agents who
violates Utah Code Ann. § 16-10-47(b), a penalty, in addition to
other damages or remedies afforded by law, of 10% of the value of
the shares owned by the shareholder (but not to exceed $5,000).
Because Webb is a shareholder of record entitled to examine
R.O.A.'s books and records, and because R.O.A. and Reagan, on
more than one occasion, and Hall, on at least one occasion, have
each violated that right, the statutory penalty is, as a matter
of law, to be assessed against each of them with respect to each
such occurrence.

-11-

ARGUMENTS
POINT I
AS A SHAREHOLDER OF RECORD OF RtO.A., WEBB HAS AN
ABSOLUTE RIGHT OF EXAMINATION,
The pivotal question in the District Court's summary
judgment proceeding was whether Webb ceased to be a shareholder
of R.O.A. by virtue of R.O.A. #s notice of the exercise* of its
option to purchase Webb's R.O.A. stock.

In his motion for

partial summary judgment, Webb sought to enforce his statutory
right as a shareholder under Utah Code Ann. § 16-10-47(b) to
examine R.O.A.'s books and records.

In defense of its refusal to

allow Webb's examination of its books and records, R.O.A. argued
that upon Webb's receipt of R.O.A.'s notice of exercise of option
to purchase his shares, Webb's shareholder status and rights were
terminated.
Utah Code Ann. § 16-10-2(15) defines "shareholder" as
"one who is a holder of record of shares in a corporation."
(emphasis added).

The record indisputably shows that (i) the

option purchase price for Webb's stock has never been determined;
(ii) R.O.A. has tendered no consideration whatsoever to Webb for
his stock; (iii) Webb has never endorsed his stock for transfer;
and (iv) Webb has not delivered his stock to R.O.A. or any other
purchaser.

(R. at 484).

The Utah Supreme Court observed in Goddard v. General
Reduction & Chemical Co., 57 Utah 180, 186, 193 P. 1103, 1105
(1920), that the "absolute right of inspection is limited . . .
to those to whom the stock has been transferred on th€> books of
-12-

the company."

As stated above, it is an uncontroverted fact that

Webb has at all times pertinent to this action continued to be
identified on the books of R.O.A. as a shareholder of record of
R.O.A.

(R. at 178-181).
As further indisputable evidence of Webb's continuing

status as a shareholder of R.O.A., Webb, of his own volition, and
at R.O.A.'s request, pledged his R.O.A. stock to First Security
Bank of Utah as security for a loan to R.O.A. approximately two
months after R.O.A. exercised its option to purchase Webb's
stock.1

(R. at 484). The uncontroverted fact that R.O.A.

requested Webb to pledge his stock as security for R.O.A.'s First
Security loan subsequent to the exercise of its option to
purchase Webb's shares, (R. at 484), is wholly inconsistent with
R.O.A.'s contention, as well as the District Court's ruling, that
Webb ceased to be a shareholder of record as of the date R.O.A.
exercised its option.
Every court that has confronted this issue has held
that a shareholder retains his status and statutory rights as a
shareholder, despite being bound by contract to sell his shares
to a third party, until the shares are paid for and transferred
on the books of the corporation.

In Estate of Bishop v. Antilles

Enterprises. Inc., 252 F.2d 498, 499 (3rd Cir. 1958), the

lr

This Court has held that the pledge of stock as security
for a loan does not extinguish the shareholder's legal title to
the stock. Morris v. Oqden State Bankr 84 Utah 127, 141, 28 P.2d
138, 143-44 (1934) (title to pledged stock remains in pledgor
until pledgee's lien is foreclosed); Gowans v. Rockport
Irrigation Co., 77 Utah 198, 202, 293 P. 4, 6 (1930).
-13-

shareholders of the respondent corporation entered into a crosspurchase agreement which provided that upon the death of
shareholder Cory Bishop, the surviving shareholders had the
option to purchase his shares from his estate at book value.
Following Bishop's death, Vose, one of the surviving
shareholders, asserted his right to purchase Bishop's stock from
his estate, claiming the stock was worthless and tendering $1.00
in payment.

The administratrix of Bishop's estate argued

successfully before the district court that the estate was
entitled, as a shareholder, to examine the corporation's books
and records.
On appeal, the respondent corporation contended that
"by virtue of the agreement between the stockholders, title to
and ownership of Bishop's stock had passed to Vose immediately
upon the election of the latter to purchase it."
omitted).

Id. (footnote

The Third Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the

corporation's argument and held that even though an option had
been exercised to purchase the stock, which exercise "vested in
Vose the right to have the stock transferred to him upon payment
of the purchase price it did not divest the petitioner . . . of
legal title to the shares or of the rights of a stockholder."
Id.

Moreover, the court concluded that even assuming the

agreement to sell the stock was valid and binding,
the petitioner's right . . . to have access to the
books and records of the corporation certainly will
continue at least until after the proper amount of the
purchase price has been authoritatively determined and
has been paid. Until then it is obvious that the
petitioner has a very real interest in securing
-14-

accurate information as to the state of the respondent
corporation' s accounts.
Id.
In Knaebel v. Heiner. 673 P.2d 885 (Alaska 1983), the
Alaska Supreme Court rejected the argument that a shareholder who
had executed a valid contract calling for the exchange of his
stock prior to the date he demanded his right of inspection had
no status as a shareholder for purposes of exercising his
statutory right of inspection.

Jeffrey Knaebel, a shareholder of

Resource Associates of Alaska, Inc. ("RAA"), had entered into an
agreement with RAA and the other two major shareholders of RAA to
exchange his RAA stock for the stock of RAA's wholly owned
subsidiary.

Id. at 885-6.

Heiner, RAA's records officer,

refused Knaebel's written demand for inspection of the books and
records of RAA pursuant to Alaska Stat. § 10.05.240# based on the
argument "that if there was a valid contract for the exchange of
stock in effect, which called for performance prior to the date
of Knaebel's demand for inspection, Knaebel could have no right
of inspection after that date."

Id. at 886.

In an action by Knaebel to enforce his right of
inspection, the trial court agreed with Heiner and granted
Heiner's motion for summary judgment.

The Alaska Supreme Court

reversed the trial court's ruling on appeal, reasoning that
although the exchange agreement did not specify the manner of the
"exchange" of the stock, "some form of physical tender was
contemplated, and . . . unless and until the exchange occurred,
the agreement, at least on this point, . . . was executory."
-15-

Id.

at 887 (footnotes omitted).

The court concluded that there was

no basis for the argument "that the agreement by itself
effectively cancelled Knaebel/s shareholder of retcord status as
of October 15, 1980, any more than a land sale contract which
specifies a date for closing cancels a recorded deed on the
specified date.11

Id.

The court held that Knaebel, who, due to

the executory status of the exchange agreement continued to be a
shareholder of record, was therefore entitled by law to examine
RAA's books and records.

Id. at 888.

In Shelters, Inc. v. Mankin, 130 Ga. App. 859, 204
S.E.2d 810, 811 (1974), the Georgia Court of Appeals also
concluded that a shareholder's execution of a contract with a
third person for the sale of his stock, which contract remained
executory, did not deprive the shareholder of his statutory right
to inspect the corporation's books and records since the
shareholder continued to be carried on the corporation's books as
a shareholder of record.
In Hoover v. Fox Rig & Lumber Co.. 199 Okla. 672, 189
P.2d 929, 930 (1948), Hoover, the petitioner, sought a writ of
mandamus compelling Fox Rig & Lumber Co. and others to permit his
examination of the Fox Rig's books and records.

The record

before the trial court showed that the Articles of Incorporation
of Fox Rig granted it the right of first refusal to purchase the
stock of any shareholder attempting to sell his stock.

The

record also showed that Hoover had notified Fox Rig of his intent
to sell his stock, that Fox Rig had duly exercised its option to
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purchase the stock and, moreover, that Fox Rig had offered and
tendered payment for the stock.

Fox Rig made repeated demands

upon Hoover for delivery of the stock which Hoover consistently
rejected.

Fox Rig argued, in defense to Hoover's petition for

writ of mandamus, that "by reason of these facts the plaintiff is
not in equity the owner of any stock in the defendant corporation
and is not entitled to maintain this action."

Id. at 931. The

trial court denied Hoover's petition, concluding that due to the
disputed question of stock ownership, Hoover did not show a clear
legal right to the writ.

Id.

The Oklahoma Supreme Court reversed the trial court's
ruling, concluding that despite Fox Rig's valid exercise of its
option to purchase the stock, "[w]hile plaintiff remained a
shareholder of record, he had right of inspection,
notwithstanding that defendant corporation may have an unexecuted
contract to purchase the stock from plaintiff."
Court observed,
ownership.

Id. at 932. The

"The right to inspect is an incident of stock

The right remains with the legal owner.

The legal

title to the stock in question remained in petitioner, Defendant
Corporation claimed no more than an equitable right."

Id.

Summarizing the opinions of the courts that have
addressed the precise issue presented in the instant case, the
authors of Fletcher Cyclopedia of the Law of Private Corporations
("Fletcher Cyclopedia of Corporations") wrote:
A mere offer by the corporation to buy a stockholder's
stock at a price fixed by the corporation does not
affect their status. Similarly, a shareholders'
reorganization agreement requiring the major
-17-

shareholders to exchange their stock for stock in
another corporation does not by itself effectively
cancel their status where the agreement remains
executory until the actual exchange has occurred.,
Likewise, stockholders are not precluded from
inspecting corporate books and records by reason of an
executed contract for the sale of their stock in the
corporation. Whether a contract to sell or exchange
shares is deemed ultimately to be fully executed or
executory at the time the shareholders demand
inspection and whether the shareholders' names were
ever removed from the books determines status, and
hence whether the shareholders have a right of
inspection pursuant to shareholder-of-record statutes.
Fletcher Cyc. Corp. § 2230 (perm, ed.) (footnotes omitted).
The cases discussed above and Webb's case before this
Court are indistinguishable.

In each of the foregoing cases, as

in the instant case, a shareholder bound by an executory contract
to tender his shares upon receipt of payment for his shares
sought to exercise his statutory right to examine the books and
records of the corporation.

In each case the court upheld the

shareholder's statutory right of examination because the
shareholder, not having received payment for and not having
transferred title to his shares, continued to be a "shareholder
of record."

Each court concluded that the shareholder right of

examination is an inseparable component of the legal ownership of
stock.

See, e.g., Hoover v. Fox Rig & Lumber Co,,, 189 P.2d at

932.
Respondents R.O.A. and Reagan cited no cases in the
summary judgment proceedings, nor are there any cases, supporting
the District Court's ruling.

The shareholder examination cases

cited by R.O.A. in support of its argument that Webb's
shareholder rights were terminated by R.O.A.'s notice of exercise
-18-

of its option are clearly distinguishable and inapposite since
the shareholder in each of those cases had either (i) received
payment for his shares and was subject to an action for specific
performance, Dierkina v. Associated Book Service, Inc., 31 Misc.
2d 995, 222 N.Y.S.2d 729, 730 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. I960); (ii) endorsed
his shares and delivered them to an escrow agent pending full
payment of the price, Nash v. Gay Apparel Corp., 11 Misc. 2d 768,
175 N.Y.S.2d 938, 939 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1958); (iii) sold and
transferred the shares, although he attempted to retain a postsale right of inspection, Rosenberg v. Steinberg-Kass, Inc., 18
Misc. 2d 880, 190 N.Y.S.2d 135, 136 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1959); or
(iv) entered into a binding purchase/sale agreement with the
purchasing corporation providing for installment payments secured
by a chattel mortgage on the corporation's personalty, Tracy v.
Perkins-Tracy Printing Co., 278 Minn. 159, 153 N.W.2d 241, 243
(1967) .
There is also no merit to R.O.A.'s argument in the
summary judgment proceedings that despite the absence of payment,
endorsement and delivery an absolute sale of Webb's stock
occurred upon R.O.A.'s notice of exercise.

(R. at 151-153).

R.O.A.'s argument that Webb's delivery of certificates was not
essential to the passing of title since the sale was absolute and
Webb was under a duty to transfer his stock, (R. at 152), not
only begs the question but is wholly unsupported by the relevant
case law. It is a well-settled principle of contract law that the
exercise of an option to purchase stock does not constitute the
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automatic purchase of the stock, but rather gives rise to an
executory contract for the purchase thereof.

Addressing the

effect of the exercise of an option to purchase stock, the
California Court of Appeals concluded in Glascock v. Sukumlyn,
131 Cal. App. 2d 587, 281 P.2d 90, 93 (1955), that the optionee's
exercise of the option does not automatically transfer the stock
to him by operation of law, but rather creates a bilateral
executory contract pursuant to which, for adequate consideration,
the optionee agrees to buy and the optionor agrees to sell the
subject stock.

The court observed:

[Options] are not binding agreements to sell the
subject of the option—land, mines, livestock,
merchandise, corporate stock. They are offers to sell
on prescribed terms and there is no contract until the
offer is accepted. When the latter occurs and the
optionee complies with the express terms, the
unilateral contract becomes bilateral. Upon payment of
the price named in the option within the time
specified, from that moment, the optionor no longer
owns an interest in the optioned property, but is owner
of only the property he received as consideration.
Id.

See also Martindell v. Fiduciary Counsel, Inc., 133 N. J.

Eq. 408, 30 A.2d 281, 286 (1943) (notice of unqualified
acceptance of stock purchase option creates a bilateral executory
contract of sale, but legal title to the stock remains in the
vendor until the sale is consummated).
Furthermore, in citing Fletcher Cyclopedia of
Corporations for the proposition that payment is not necessarily
essential to the passing of title, (R. at 152), R.O.A. omitted
the remainder of the cited sentence: "but it may be so under the
terms of the contract."

Fletcher Cvc. Corp. § 5628 (perm. ed.).
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The option agreement between R.O.A. and Webb provides that ff[i]n
the event the stock is being purchased pursuant to the exercise
of options under paragraphs 9 or 11, the purchase price shall be
paid" (i) in cash, (ii) on an installment basis or (iii) pursuant
to other terms agreed upon by the parties.
added).

The agreement further provides that

(R. at 73) (emphasis
ff

[t]he stockholders

shall retain all their rights as stockholders of the Corporation,
except those specifically modified by this Agreement."
at 75).

(R.

There is no provision in the agreement that upon

exercise of its option, R.O.A. is, without payment to Webb,
automatically vested with title to Webb's shares.

Payment as

specified in the option agreement is clearly a condition
precedent to Webb's obligation to pass title.

R.O.A.'s notice of

exercise of its option to purchase Webb's stock did not deprive
Webb of his ownership of the stock, nor will it do so until the
consideration is paid and the sale is completed.

R.O.A.'s

arguments to the contrary are without merit.
Based on (i) the unambiguous statutory definition of a
"shareholder," (ii) the undisputed fact that Webb continues to be
a "shareholder of record" on the books of R.O.A. and has never
received payment for, endorsed or transferred his R.O.A. stock,
and (iii) a line of unanimous decisions upholding Webb's
shareholder right of inspection, Webb respectfully petitions the
Court to summarily reverse the District Court's erroneous ruling
and grant the further relief requested in this appeal.
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POINT II
WEBB REPEATEDLY MADE THE REQUISITE WRITTEN DEMAND
STATING A REASONABLE TIME AND A PROPER PURPOSE FOR HIS
SHAREHOLDER EXAMINATIONS,
No one disputes the fact that the requisite written
demands for shareholder examination were made by Webb*, (R. at
3-4, 484-485).

Whether these requested shareholder examinations

were noticed for reasonable times and for a proper purpose is a
question of law.

Respondents' contention that W€>bb sought to

examine R.O.A.'s books and records at unreasonable times is
groundless.

This Court held in Clawson v. Clayton. 33 Utah 266,

272, 93 P. 729, 731 (1908), that normal business hours are
"reasonable hours."

See also Fletcher Cyc. Corp. § 2242 (perm,

ed.) (reasonable time means normal business hours).

Furthermore,

after Webb's attorneys and accountants were repeatedly denied
access on the normal business days and at the business hours
specified in Webb's requests, R.O.A. designated, and Webb
accepted, June 15, 1987 as the date on which Webb's examination
could take place.

(R. at 61, 95-96).

Nevertheless, when Webb's

agents appeared at the agreed upon time and place to conduct the
examination, R.O.A. through Reagan and Hall again denied them
access on the spurious grounds that Webb was no longer a
shareholder of R.O.A.

Given these facts, R.O.A. and Reagan

cannot argue in good faith that Webb's requests were for
unreasonable times.
Utah Code Ann. § 16-10-47(b), which is modeled after
the Delaware statute, defines "proper purpose" as any "purpose
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reasonably related to the person's interest as a shareholder."
As a general rule, when one state borrows a statute from another
state, the interpretations by the courts of the earlier enacting
state are persuasive.

Meyer v. Ford Industries. Inc., 272 Or.

531, 538 P.2d 353, 356 (1975); Fleischhauer v. Bilstad, 233 Or.
578, 379 P.2d 880, 883 (1963).

The Delaware courts have held

that a shareholder's proper purpose includes ascertaining whether
the business of the corporation has been properly conducted,
Nodana Petroleum Corp. v. State ex. rel. Brennan. 50 Del. 76, 123
A.2d 243, 246 (1956), and determining the value of the
shareholder's stock, CM & M Group Inc. v Carroll, 453 A.2d 788,
792-93 (Del. 1982) (valuation of shares in order to negotiate a
fair sale of stock is a proper purpose for inspection); State ex.
rel. Rogers v. Sherman Oil Co., 31 Del. 570, 117 A. 122, 126
(Del. Super. Ct. 1922).

Delaware courts have also held that as

long as a shareholder establishes one proper purpose for
inspection, all other purposes are irrelevant.

Skouras v.

Admiralty Enterprises, Inc.f 386 A.2d 674, 678 (Del. Ch. 1978).
Respondents R.O.A. and Reagan contend that Webb has the
appraisal process to determine the value of his shares and that
no shareholder examination is necessary.

Independant appraisers,

however, will not act as Webb's agents and will not investigate,
on Webb's behalf, any impropriety or irregularity with respect to
business transacted, or R.O.A.'s recordkeeping and accounting
practices.

Respondents' attempt to characterize Webb's motives
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as harrassing and vexatious is a further indication of
Respondents' bad faith and is wholly unsupported by the record.
The inviolability of statutory shareholder examination
rights is demonstrated by a consistent line of cases holding that
the fact that a shareholder may have other rights of access to
corporate records, including discovery rights when engaged in
litigation with the corporation, does not abrogate his statutory
right to examination.

See, e.g., Knaebel v. Heiner, 645 P.2d

201, 204 (Alaska 1982) and cases cited therein.

R.O.A. and

Reagan simply cannot in good faith dispute that Webb's request
was for a "reasonable purpose."
POINT III
WEBB IS ENTITLED. AS A MATTER OF LAW, TO AN AWARD OF
STATUTORY PENALTIES AND ATTORNEYS' FEES FOR THE
DEFENDANTS' REFUSAL TO PERMIT ACCESS TO R.O.A.'& BOOKS
AND RECORDS.
Utah Code Ann. § 16-10-47(c) provides that any officer
or agent who, or corporation which, shall refuse to allow a
properly demanded shareholder examination "shall be liable to
such shareholder in a penalty of 10% of the value of the shares
owned by such shareholder, in addition to any other damages or
remedy afforded him by law; but no such penalty shall exceed
$5,000." (emphasis added).

Upon determination that R.O.A.,

Reagan and Hall have violated Section 16-10-47(c), the statutory
penalty should be imposed as a matter of law.

See ABA-ALI Model

Bus. Corp. Act Ann. § 52, % 2 (2d ed. 1971) (primary purpose of
inspection legislation is to prescribe penalties so that
corporations and officers will be less likely to refuse access
-24-

and "delay inspection until the right was actually litigated."
(emphasis added)); see also. Naquin v. Air Engineered Systems &
Services. Inc.. 423 So. 2d 713, 716-17 (La. 1983) (strict
construction of penalty would render it meaningless); Meyer v.
Ford Industries. Inc.. 272 Or. 531, 538 P.2d 353, 359 (1975)
(court could require penalty for each separate violation).
Respondents have disputed the fact that the value of
Webb's R.O.A. stock is greater than $50,000. Webb nevertheless
requests this Court's ruling, as a matter of law, that Webb is
entitled to an award of three statutory penalties in an amount to
be determined at trial, against R.O.A., as a corporation, against
Reagan, as an officer, and against Hall, as an agent of R.O.A.
for refusing on three separate occasions, in violation of Utah
Code Ann. § 16-10-47(c), to allow Webb, his agents and attorney,
to examine and make extracts from R.O.A.'s books and records of
account.
CONCLUSION
Webb has a right, as a matter of law, to examine the
books and records of account of R.O.A.

He is a shareholder of

record and has made the requisite written demands to examine such
records at reasonable times and for proper purposes.

Because

Respondents R.O.A. and Reagan, as well as Hall, R.O.A.'s attorney
and agent, have repeatedly refused to permit such examination,
Webb is entitled, as a matter of law, to an award of statutory
penalties against R.O.A., Reagan and Hall for each such refusal
(in an amount yet to be determined by appraisal), as provided in
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Utah Code Ann, § 16-10-47(c).

Webb respectfully requests the

Utah Supreme Court to reverse the District Court's order and to
enter an order directing the District Court to grant Webb's
motion for partial summary judgment (i) issuing an injunction
pursuant to Rule 65A(a) and (e) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure requiring R.O.A. to make its books and records
available to Webb for shareholder examination; (ii) imposing the
statutory penalties in amounts to be determined at trial for each
past refusal to allow such examination; and (iii) granting such
other and further relief as this Court may deem necessary and
proper.
Respectfully submitted this Z>

day of December,

1987.
LeBOEUF, LAMB, LEIBY & MacRAE

Val J. Christensen, Esq.
1000 Kearns Building
136 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Counsel for Plaintiff-Appellant
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